Warfare in Italy
By: Jacob Copley
In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, a weak military system in Italy resulted in the downfall of many Italian city-states and their eventual governance by French and Spanish rulers. To understand how Italy’s military influenced its ability to fight off the two largest foreign invasions it saw in the fifteenth century, one must understand the role of the condottiere. The condottiere were mostly Italians and, for lack of a better word, mercenaries. They were contracted (and paid) by the various rulers of different city-states and were known to change sides at the prospect of greater pay. For the most part, Italian city-states relied on various condottieri (or mercenary captains) to protect them from invaders. Between city states, this was often effective—but Italy’s natural barrier of the alps to the north, which separated it from France, would prove to be detrimental: They were cut off from the improvements in warfare developing just outside their borders in Spain and, most importantly, France.
The first major foreign invasion of Italy was from France in 1494, called Charles VIII’s War. Before the end of 1495, King Charles VIII had already conquered Naples (in the southernmost part of Italy). It was only by the creation of a league between Milan (in northern Italy), Venice, Ferdinand, and Maximilian that Charles was ousted. However, the result of the war was clear for any and all to see: Italy was weak. The condottiere were unable to hold their ground against the French. Due to a newfound awareness of Italy’s military weakness, France was more confident in staging another invasion. In 1499, France invaded Italy again—this time under a new ruler, Louis XII.
Unlike his predecessor, Louis XII established a strong foothold in the northern city-state of Milan, easily snatching up castles and towns as he went. It was not long before Louis took the duchy of Milan. Then, he turned his eye to Naples. It is here, however, that Louis XII made his most significant mistake: He bargained with the Spanish, agreeing to split Naples between them. Although this allowed Louis to conquer Naples relatively quickly, many historians argue that he could have done it alone and that an earlier treaty with Spain ensured he had nothing to fear. Quarrels between France and Spain over the division of territory would inevitably spark another war, this time between the two invading countries. Spain won this war, driving the French from Italy.
However, a large part of Italy’s weakness also came from the fickle nature of their condottiere. For instance, in 1500, after Louis conquered Milan, he faced an army led by a man called Lodovico the Moor, who was leading a small army of Swiss mercenaries. Rather than fight Lodovico, Louis sent a significantly larger army of Swiss mercenaries to negotiate with those in Lodovico’s camp. Lodovico’s mercenaries deserted him at the prospect of better pay from Louis, and Lodovico himself was betrayed by a soldier in his army upon his escape. Many Italian contemporaries, including Machiavelli, author of The Prince, criticized Italy’s reliance on mercenaries, whom they felt had crippled its ability to defend itself from foreign invaders. Perhaps they were correct; for, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Italy lay in Spanish hands.
The first major foreign invasion of Italy was from France in 1494, called Charles VIII’s War. Before the end of 1495, King Charles VIII had already conquered Naples (in the southernmost part of Italy). It was only by the creation of a league between Milan (in northern Italy), Venice, Ferdinand, and Maximilian that Charles was ousted. However, the result of the war was clear for any and all to see: Italy was weak. The condottiere were unable to hold their ground against the French. Due to a newfound awareness of Italy’s military weakness, France was more confident in staging another invasion. In 1499, France invaded Italy again—this time under a new ruler, Louis XII.
Unlike his predecessor, Louis XII established a strong foothold in the northern city-state of Milan, easily snatching up castles and towns as he went. It was not long before Louis took the duchy of Milan. Then, he turned his eye to Naples. It is here, however, that Louis XII made his most significant mistake: He bargained with the Spanish, agreeing to split Naples between them. Although this allowed Louis to conquer Naples relatively quickly, many historians argue that he could have done it alone and that an earlier treaty with Spain ensured he had nothing to fear. Quarrels between France and Spain over the division of territory would inevitably spark another war, this time between the two invading countries. Spain won this war, driving the French from Italy.
However, a large part of Italy’s weakness also came from the fickle nature of their condottiere. For instance, in 1500, after Louis conquered Milan, he faced an army led by a man called Lodovico the Moor, who was leading a small army of Swiss mercenaries. Rather than fight Lodovico, Louis sent a significantly larger army of Swiss mercenaries to negotiate with those in Lodovico’s camp. Lodovico’s mercenaries deserted him at the prospect of better pay from Louis, and Lodovico himself was betrayed by a soldier in his army upon his escape. Many Italian contemporaries, including Machiavelli, author of The Prince, criticized Italy’s reliance on mercenaries, whom they felt had crippled its ability to defend itself from foreign invaders. Perhaps they were correct; for, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Italy lay in Spanish hands.
Works Cited:
Burckhardt, Jacob. The Civilization of Renaissance in Italy. New York: Mentor, 1960. Print.
Mallett, Michael Edward. Mercenaries and Their Masters; Warfare in Renaissance Italy. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1974. Print.
Sismondi, J. C. L. Sismondi De. A History of the Italian Republics; Being a View of the Origin, Progress, and Fall of Italian Freedom. Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1966. Print.
Vernon, H. M. Italy from 1494-1790. Cambridge: Cambridge UP., 1909. Print.
Mallett, Michael Edward. Mercenaries and Their Masters; Warfare in Renaissance Italy. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1974. Print.
Sismondi, J. C. L. Sismondi De. A History of the Italian Republics; Being a View of the Origin, Progress, and Fall of Italian Freedom. Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1966. Print.
Vernon, H. M. Italy from 1494-1790. Cambridge: Cambridge UP., 1909. Print.