Machiavelli and Sun Tzu
By: Jacob Copley
Warfare and politics have always been related in the minds of dozens of brilliant scholars. Exactly how they relate, however, is a much more difficult question to answer. The many different venues with regards to warfare and politics provide myriad ways for scholars to mesh the two. When warfare becomes politics, vital activities such as deception and intrigue become even more important. By a similar token, when politics become warfare, precepts important in politics—like momentum—prove their importance in warfare. Not only present in the writings of great philosophers like Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, examination of events in history where politics transitioned into warfare, and vice versa, provide a strong base to determine their relationship.
Sun Tzu, born in China (544 BC), author of the Art of War, viewed war as violent politics. Perhaps even more than Machiavelli, who would come nearly two millennia later, Sun Tzu emphasized deception. He stressed the importance of posturing, of making sure that the true form or ability of a person was obscured from their enemies. In his writings, Sun Tzu would reference what one should do to confuse an opponent, “Even though you are competent, appear incompetent. Though effective, appear ineffective.” (Tzu 6) To Sun Tzu, war was the last resort in any conflict between nations. Should diplomacy fail, it was far better to resort to dirty tricks like assassination of important figures, or bribery.
It is important to account for the fact that Sun Tzu, for the most part, lived during the prelude to the Warring States period in China, the Spring and Autumn period. This meant China was experiencing massive amounts of political upheaval and warfare. To the minds of many living in China at that time, politics and warfare were likely interchangeable. Assassination of other figures to gain political footholds would not only have been common, but also practical in both politics and war. Less than twenty years after Sun Tzu presumably died (the exact time period of his life and death is uncertain), the different nations of China coalesced into eight states that would experience near constant upheaval for almost two hundred years.
By contrast, Machiavelli, born in Italy (1469 AD) and author of The Prince and his own Art of War, viewed politics as a warlike activity. More so than his predecessor, Machiavelli emphasized the psychology in warfare and its relation to intrigue. An avid supporter of “shock and awe” tactics, Machiavelli praised Caesar—who never rested after a victory—for pursuing the enemy “with great impetus and fury” (Machiavelli War 101). Like Sun Tzu, Machiavelli emphasized deception. He referenced the actions of Menno Rodius, who sent a soldier in the guise of a fugitive to an opposing army. The soldier’s job was to deceive Menno’s opponents and make them believe his army was weak and disorganized. This caused his opponent to assault Menno, and allowed Menno a much easier victory. However, to understand how the two philosophers may have differed in placing their emphasis on deception, one must examine their contrasting views on the nature of humanity. While Sun Tzu did not necessarily view humans as self-serving, Machiavelli did. To an even greater degree, Machiavelli believed men’s actions were controlled by unrealistic desires and unachievable goals, greed, and short-sightedness—perhaps influenced by the time he spent tortured by the Medici. The way he viewed people would have influenced the way he went about deception. Because he saw humanity as short-sighted and self-serving, they were more likely to believe what they wanted to believe and make themselves easy targets of deception. (Fischer)
While Sun Tzu lived in the prelude to the Warring States period, Machiavelli would have lived through two defining wars in Italy by the age of thirty-five. His life would be filled with news of warfare in Italy and, a year before he died, a war would have finished only to give rise to the immediate beginning of another. Perhaps the reason he viewed politics as a warlike activity was because warfare was so much more common than politics in his life. By contrast, Sun Tzu, despite whatever wars that may have occurred during his life, likely would have dealt with politics far more frequently than with warfare, demonstrating why he viewed warfare as violent politics.
Both Sun Tzu and Machiavelli spoke at length on warfare and politics. Interestingly, while they both agreed that warfare and politics were intertwined, they differed in belief on where the power in each branches should be. Whereas Machiavelli seemed to staunchly advocate the leader of the civil branch also being the leader of the military branch, Sun Tzu seemed much more reluctant about the branches mixing. Sun Tzu believed that politicians meddling in military affairs often made situations more complicated than they were before, due to the civil leaders not being entirely up to speed with military matters. Despite their differing views on the balance of power within military and political branches, they reached a consensus on the concept of both politics and warfare being related.
Though, however intelligent the two philosophers may have been, they could not have accounted for all facets of warfare. While behaviors they advocated may have been obvious for their birth places, historically the difference between military and political actions are not always clear. In more modern times, many skillful leaders made use of intrigue long before they allowed war to come to the forefront. For instance, President Theodore Roosevelt desperately wanted to complete the Panama Canal in southern Central America. However, the Colombian government was being particularly uncooperative, asking for a variety of favors from the United States before they would allow them to create the canal. Tired of being slowed by politics, Roosevelt contacted Panamanian nationalists, armed, supported, and finally organized a revolt. After Panama separated from Columbia, Roosevelt supported the new government, entered into negotiations, and received permission to create the Panama Canal. Here, the boundary between warfare and politics is less defined. One scholar may argue that Roosevelt was engaging in political warfare with Columbia, whereas another may note that a few warships were sent by the United States to intimidate Columbia. Perhaps a more defined period of deception and intrigue is that of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Unlike the incident in Panama, the United States was directly involved in some of the many conflicts that define the Cold War, such as the Korean war and the Vietnam war.
According to both Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, deception and intrigue are two of the most important factors when warfare blurs into politics. However, when politics blur into warfare, keeping momentum is one of the most important things for any warring nation to do. With regards to politics, modern news stations often report on one candidate “having the momentum” going into an election due to politically savvy moves made by the contender, or having particularly active supporters. Many elections are decided by this momentum. Sun Tzu and Machiavelli both emphasized the need for short, swift campaigns, the former claiming that he had never seen a skillful maneuver executed over a long duration. During Machiavelli’s time, Italy experienced two major invasions from France and was soundly defeated in both, owing in part to the speed at which France conquered Italy. Yet, the momentum of France’s military campaign in no way detracted from a separate war of intrigue. With regards to intrigue, Sun Tzu advocates bribery as one of many tactics. When confronted with an army of Swiss mercenaries that may have halted their momentum, rather than fight them, France instead negotiated with and offered to pay more than their Italian contractors. The army defected, France’s momentum continued. More recently, Germany conquered most of Europe within three years of the start of World War II due to superior momentum and skillful use of blitzkrieg (lit. lightning war) tactics. By the same token, Germany was defeated within three years after their initial burst, owing in large part to the speed at which the Allied nations responded after the entrance of the United States into World War II.
Sun Tzu and Machiavelli both wrote their views on warfare and politics with a bias toward the time period and culture they lived in. While Sun Tzu lived in a time of political turmoil, Machiavelli experienced the heat of warfare. The differences between their upbringings and lives would have influenced them ideologically toward their individual beliefs, shaping their writings with regards to warfare and politics. These differences would lead them to their beliefs, both in viewing politics as a warlike activity, and in viewing warfare as violent politics.
Sun Tzu, born in China (544 BC), author of the Art of War, viewed war as violent politics. Perhaps even more than Machiavelli, who would come nearly two millennia later, Sun Tzu emphasized deception. He stressed the importance of posturing, of making sure that the true form or ability of a person was obscured from their enemies. In his writings, Sun Tzu would reference what one should do to confuse an opponent, “Even though you are competent, appear incompetent. Though effective, appear ineffective.” (Tzu 6) To Sun Tzu, war was the last resort in any conflict between nations. Should diplomacy fail, it was far better to resort to dirty tricks like assassination of important figures, or bribery.
It is important to account for the fact that Sun Tzu, for the most part, lived during the prelude to the Warring States period in China, the Spring and Autumn period. This meant China was experiencing massive amounts of political upheaval and warfare. To the minds of many living in China at that time, politics and warfare were likely interchangeable. Assassination of other figures to gain political footholds would not only have been common, but also practical in both politics and war. Less than twenty years after Sun Tzu presumably died (the exact time period of his life and death is uncertain), the different nations of China coalesced into eight states that would experience near constant upheaval for almost two hundred years.
By contrast, Machiavelli, born in Italy (1469 AD) and author of The Prince and his own Art of War, viewed politics as a warlike activity. More so than his predecessor, Machiavelli emphasized the psychology in warfare and its relation to intrigue. An avid supporter of “shock and awe” tactics, Machiavelli praised Caesar—who never rested after a victory—for pursuing the enemy “with great impetus and fury” (Machiavelli War 101). Like Sun Tzu, Machiavelli emphasized deception. He referenced the actions of Menno Rodius, who sent a soldier in the guise of a fugitive to an opposing army. The soldier’s job was to deceive Menno’s opponents and make them believe his army was weak and disorganized. This caused his opponent to assault Menno, and allowed Menno a much easier victory. However, to understand how the two philosophers may have differed in placing their emphasis on deception, one must examine their contrasting views on the nature of humanity. While Sun Tzu did not necessarily view humans as self-serving, Machiavelli did. To an even greater degree, Machiavelli believed men’s actions were controlled by unrealistic desires and unachievable goals, greed, and short-sightedness—perhaps influenced by the time he spent tortured by the Medici. The way he viewed people would have influenced the way he went about deception. Because he saw humanity as short-sighted and self-serving, they were more likely to believe what they wanted to believe and make themselves easy targets of deception. (Fischer)
While Sun Tzu lived in the prelude to the Warring States period, Machiavelli would have lived through two defining wars in Italy by the age of thirty-five. His life would be filled with news of warfare in Italy and, a year before he died, a war would have finished only to give rise to the immediate beginning of another. Perhaps the reason he viewed politics as a warlike activity was because warfare was so much more common than politics in his life. By contrast, Sun Tzu, despite whatever wars that may have occurred during his life, likely would have dealt with politics far more frequently than with warfare, demonstrating why he viewed warfare as violent politics.
Both Sun Tzu and Machiavelli spoke at length on warfare and politics. Interestingly, while they both agreed that warfare and politics were intertwined, they differed in belief on where the power in each branches should be. Whereas Machiavelli seemed to staunchly advocate the leader of the civil branch also being the leader of the military branch, Sun Tzu seemed much more reluctant about the branches mixing. Sun Tzu believed that politicians meddling in military affairs often made situations more complicated than they were before, due to the civil leaders not being entirely up to speed with military matters. Despite their differing views on the balance of power within military and political branches, they reached a consensus on the concept of both politics and warfare being related.
Though, however intelligent the two philosophers may have been, they could not have accounted for all facets of warfare. While behaviors they advocated may have been obvious for their birth places, historically the difference between military and political actions are not always clear. In more modern times, many skillful leaders made use of intrigue long before they allowed war to come to the forefront. For instance, President Theodore Roosevelt desperately wanted to complete the Panama Canal in southern Central America. However, the Colombian government was being particularly uncooperative, asking for a variety of favors from the United States before they would allow them to create the canal. Tired of being slowed by politics, Roosevelt contacted Panamanian nationalists, armed, supported, and finally organized a revolt. After Panama separated from Columbia, Roosevelt supported the new government, entered into negotiations, and received permission to create the Panama Canal. Here, the boundary between warfare and politics is less defined. One scholar may argue that Roosevelt was engaging in political warfare with Columbia, whereas another may note that a few warships were sent by the United States to intimidate Columbia. Perhaps a more defined period of deception and intrigue is that of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Unlike the incident in Panama, the United States was directly involved in some of the many conflicts that define the Cold War, such as the Korean war and the Vietnam war.
According to both Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, deception and intrigue are two of the most important factors when warfare blurs into politics. However, when politics blur into warfare, keeping momentum is one of the most important things for any warring nation to do. With regards to politics, modern news stations often report on one candidate “having the momentum” going into an election due to politically savvy moves made by the contender, or having particularly active supporters. Many elections are decided by this momentum. Sun Tzu and Machiavelli both emphasized the need for short, swift campaigns, the former claiming that he had never seen a skillful maneuver executed over a long duration. During Machiavelli’s time, Italy experienced two major invasions from France and was soundly defeated in both, owing in part to the speed at which France conquered Italy. Yet, the momentum of France’s military campaign in no way detracted from a separate war of intrigue. With regards to intrigue, Sun Tzu advocates bribery as one of many tactics. When confronted with an army of Swiss mercenaries that may have halted their momentum, rather than fight them, France instead negotiated with and offered to pay more than their Italian contractors. The army defected, France’s momentum continued. More recently, Germany conquered most of Europe within three years of the start of World War II due to superior momentum and skillful use of blitzkrieg (lit. lightning war) tactics. By the same token, Germany was defeated within three years after their initial burst, owing in large part to the speed at which the Allied nations responded after the entrance of the United States into World War II.
Sun Tzu and Machiavelli both wrote their views on warfare and politics with a bias toward the time period and culture they lived in. While Sun Tzu lived in a time of political turmoil, Machiavelli experienced the heat of warfare. The differences between their upbringings and lives would have influenced them ideologically toward their individual beliefs, shaping their writings with regards to warfare and politics. These differences would lead them to their beliefs, both in viewing politics as a warlike activity, and in viewing warfare as violent politics.
Works Cited:
Baur, Lucas. "Machiavelli and Sun Tzu: Comparisons on Their Art of War."Wordpress: Liberty and Security. N.p., 21 May 2014. Web. 4 May 2015.
Fischer, Markus. "Machiavelli's Political Psychology." The Review of Politics 59.04 (1997): 789. Web.
Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1955. Print.
Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Trans. Thomas Cleary. Boston & London: Shambhala, 1991. Print.
Yuen, Derek M. C. "Deciphering Sun Tzu." Comparative Strategy 27.2 (2008): 183-200. Web.
Fischer, Markus. "Machiavelli's Political Psychology." The Review of Politics 59.04 (1997): 789. Web.
Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1955. Print.
Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Trans. Thomas Cleary. Boston & London: Shambhala, 1991. Print.
Yuen, Derek M. C. "Deciphering Sun Tzu." Comparative Strategy 27.2 (2008): 183-200. Web.